"Persuasion with Probability and Text in a Sender-receiver Game", 闫巨博博士，助理教授，南洋理工大学社会科学学院

标题：Persuasion with Probability and Text in a Sender-receiver Game
主讲人：闫巨博博士，助理教授，南洋理工大学社会科学学院
日期：2025年9月25日（星期四）
时间：14:00 - 15:00
地点：T7-106-R1

摘要:

Asymmetric information is prevalent in many economic settings and often leads to issues such as market inefficiency and adverse selection. In this study, we investigate the information transmission in a typical three-party market structure. A seller trying to sell physical or financial assets, a buyer (receiver) deciding whether to buy the asset, and a market intermediary (sender) who has private information about the quality of the sold asset. In our sender-receiver experiment, senders hold private, partial information about a binary state and their interests may be either aligned or misaligned with receivers, who observe only a common prior. Three implemented treatments include: 1) state only (baseline), in which only the state is communicated; 2) probability addition, in which the sender also reports his/her subjective probability that the state is truthful; and 3) text addition, in which the baseline recommendation is supplemented by a structured text message. Relative to state only, the text message yields the largest increase in receiver compliance, while probability message increases compliance only when reported probabilities lie in an intermediate (70–80%) range. Interestingly, the compliance level is positively associated with the extent of misreporting. Among the three treatments, misreporting is most pronounced when text is sent and, to a lesser extent, when probability is sent. In addition, when probability message is used, sender behavior differs by alignment: misaligned senders inflate probabilities compared to state only, whereas aligned senders moderate their reports. Finally, fact‐based text messages significantly increase compliance, messages revealing self-characteristics have no effect, and empty messages even reduce the compliance to a level below baseline.

主讲人:

阎居博博士现任南洋理工大学经济学助理教授。他在康奈尔大学查尔斯·H·戴森应用经济与管理学院获得经济学博士学位，同时拥有金融经济学硕士学位和计算机科学学士学位。阎博士的主要研究兴趣包括行为经济学与实验经济学，特别关注风险与不确定性下的个体决策。此外，他还从事应用微观经济学的相关研究。